All the elements were there. A failing economy. An escalating human rights abuses. A people tired of the dictatorship ready to fight for freedom and democracy. An ailing president who wanted to cling to power and will do everything to hold on. A citizenry enraged by an election dubbed as the dirtiest ever in the history of Philippine politics. The situation was literally a social volcano ready to erupt at any provocation.
And erupt it did.
February 22 – 25, 1986 became known at home and in the world as EDSA revolution. Four days of raging tension, fear, uncertainties, and towards the end, merrymaking. Yes, there were shouts of joy and jubilation because the dictator fled.
Dictatorship has come to an end. A new government spells hope of new beginning and a better life. A renewed hope for the masses and underprivileged. Or so we thought.
Close to 30 years have lapsed since the EDSA uprising. What has become of us? What has become of a revolution we have been initially proud of being a part of? Was it really a revolution or a sham?
The Unfolding Events
Prior to the four day EDSA uprising, a series of events happened that seemed to conspire against Marcos. The assassination of Ninoy Aquino at the tarmac of Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983 pointed a finger to the conjugal dictatorship. It emboldened the people to go to the streets more frequently and called for Marcos’ resignation. However, Marcos tenaciously held on, claiming his mandate to serve the people for a six year term.
Nonetheless, the issue of the ‘people’s mandate’ became very hot that talks about snap presidential election began circulating around. (Villacorte, 1989)
The divided opposition miraculously became united and chose Cory Aquino as the standard bearer to run against Marcos in the snap election. The people trooped en masse to voting places. They expressed their anger against Marcos by voting for Aquino. Marcos, of course, had everything figured out. There was massive vote buying, intimidation and disenfranchisement of voters. Flying voters abound. There was rampant snatching of ballot boxes. Volunteers for Namfrel as well as supporters of Aquino were manhandled and terrorized. Some were even killed.
The public accused the Comelec of deliberately multiplying votes for Marcos when its counting did not tally with Namfrel. The credibility of the institution was furthered questioned when the computer tabulators at the Comelec tabulation centers walked out in protest of the alleged manipulation of the counting of votes. When the election returns were finally transported to Batasang Pambansa for canvassing, the legislative body hastily proclaimed Marcos as the winner of the presidential election.
For the Filipino people, the Marcos proclamation by the Batasan was the “straw that broke the camel’s back.” Thus when Cory called for a people’s rally at the Luneta to protest the elections, the public turned up in great numbers, cheering for her as the people’s elected president.
The Role of the Church
The Church, mindful of the agitation that was engulfing the citizenry caused by the succeeding events issued statements appealing for sobriety and composure in the face of mounting protests. The National Council of Churches in the Philippines issued a critical statement “expressing great concern over the conduct of the election.” (Elwood, 1986)
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines issued a much severe statement denouncing the fraudulence that marred the presidential elections. The bishops called on the people to be vigilant and to exercise their Christian duty to work for justice in a non-violent way.
In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct… According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of the citizenry…
If such a government does not of itself freely correct the evil it has inflicted on the people, then it is our serious moral obligation as a people to make it do so.
We are not going to effect the change we seek by doing nothing, by sheer apathy. If we did nothing, we would be party to our own destruction as a people. We would be jointly guilty with the perpetrators of the wrong we want righted…
The way indicated to us now is the way of nonviolent struggle for justice.
This means active resistance of evil by peaceful means… Now is the time to repair the wrong. The wrong was systematically organized. So must its correction be. (CBCP)
The opposition, led by Aquino, had already announced a civil disobedience campaign against the Marcos administration. During the people’s victory rally at the Luneta, Aquino urged the public to boycott all media, products and services either owned by the Marcoses or by their cronies.
However, the discovery of the plot hatched by a group of reformist soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by General Ver, overtook all the plans of the opposition.
The Reform Movement in the AFP
This movement of young reformist soldiers, mostly coming from PMA class 1971 began in 1982, when a group of young idealistic officers banded up and started clamoring for reforms in the military establishment. The group called themselves as Reform the Armed Forces Movement. They assailed the military establishment for its lack of professionalism and lamented the fact that PMA graduates are being by-passed in promotions.
The suspected decline in professionalism in the AFP started when General Fabian Ver assumed the office of Chief-of-Staff. Gen. Ver was very close to former President Marcos and he used his closeness to the former President to appoint to higher positions his protégés despite their lack of qualifications.
It was inevitable then for the Reformists to think initially of Ver as the adversary instead of Marcos. They believed Ver destroyed the professional image of the military because of his unprofessional behavior.
The RAM became more vocal against the status quo in a matter of time. They issued a manifesto at the Alumni Homecoming of the Philippine Military Academy in February 17, 1985, assailing the prevailing culture in the military of awarding incompetents and by-passing those who were deserving of promotion.
RAM came out again with a statement on March 15, 1985 calling for the exclusion of the “undesirables” from the AFP. They resolutely pointed out that military’s loyalty should be directed towards the constitution and not to one man or one group. In an audacious move, the RAM made its public appearance as a group during the PMA graduation rites with a streamer that proclaim “We Belong”.
In August 1985, realizing that their demands for changes were getting nowhere, the RAM started to formulate coup plots. Escalante quoted Hamilton-Paterson, who wrote the book America’s Boy: The Marcoses and the Philippines, thus:
The RAM officers’ plan for the military coup was now formalized, with both Enrile and Ramos in full support. If the takeover was successful, a junta would be formed with Ramos heading the military and Enrile the civilian interests, pledged to conduct free elections after two years. The plan had the CIA’s backing, and in Washington the State Department went into action…(Hamilton-Paterson, 1996)
During the snap elections, these young reformist soldiers conducted a crusade for a clean and orderly election that provoked the ire of Marcos and Ver.
After the election that was tainted with much fraudulence, the soldiers were ready to take on a more active role to remove Marcos from power. However, the planned coup was discovered before the plotters can start their move. As arrest orders were issued, both Enrile and Ramos together with 300 reformist soldiers holed themselves up inside Camp Aguinaldo, and later inside Camp Crame.
The mutiny could have been easily crushed by soldiers loyal to Marcos. But as it turned out, Marcos tried to dialogue with Enrile and Ramos, and even restrained Ver from employing force.
Enrile, however, have contacted people whom he thought could provide support to their rebellion. In his press conference, he announced that Marcos had lost his mandate by cheating in the elections, that he had ordered them arrested, and that their rebellion was a defensive stance to the threat in their lives.
The escalation so essential to the rebels’ survival and prospect of victory thus got underway at an early stage. The immediate support of the Archbishop of Manila (Cardinal Sin), a retired justice of the Supreme Court (Cecilia Munoz Palma), and a leader of political mass organizations (Butz Aquino) provided the rebels an impregnable wall of protective civilians.
Cardinal Sin made support for the rebellion morally correct, if not obligatory. Munoz Palma made it seem legitimate. Butz Aquino made it politically appealing. (Escalante & De la Paz, 2000)
The presence of multitude of people in EDSA provided the rebels the necessary buffer they needed. If not for people’s participation, RAM would not have succeeded.
Looking at this juncture, one can easily assume that it was indeed the people who were responsible in forcing Marcos to leave Malacanang.
People Power
The four days of EDSA uprising was unparalleled in history. Revolutions in modern history have always been violent and bloody. But what happened at EDSA was something different. It was a revolution that was egalitarian because it involved people from all walks of life, rich and middle class, professionals and laborers, the poor and simple folks, the clergy and the laity, young and old. All together they formed a human barricade to protect the soldiers holed up in Camp Crame.
EDSA was a revolution that defied description because of its unique character. Whether it was a military revolt backed by the people or the other way around was not as essential as the fact that the EDSA uprising would not have been successful without the help coming from both groups. The people held out their hand towards the military in reconciliation and the soldiers accepted the gesture. Such action will remain etched in the memory of the Filipino people as the triumph of people power.
Forces at Work
The EDSA phenomenon drew all sorts of explanations from various sectors. From a religious perspective, the triumph of people power was the power of God working through the people. Tales of those who have participated in the human barricades and have faced the tanks at close range narrated events that could only be attributed through divine intervention. Even loyalists soldiers who threw tear gas canisters to people barricading the streets could not explain the phenomenon of the wind changing its direction towards them, thus being gassed themselves. Soldiers maneuvering the armored tanks suddenly had a change of heart upon seeing the multitude of people hand in hand ready to face death. Cardinal Sin called it “the miracle of EDSA.” Moreover, Schwenk of the Philippine Evangelical Church pointed out that “those happy ‘coincidences’ and serendipitous happenings (at EDSA) could not have come about except for Divine involvement.” (Schwenk, 1986).
The leftist groups, however, also claimed that the US government played a crucial role in forcing Marcos to step down. In his book The 1986 EDSA Uprising, Escalante discussed the role of US government in the events that unfolded before, during and the after the EDSA revolution.
Three days after President Marcos announced the snap election, and out of the public eye, U.S. officials met leaders of the Philippine opposition in Manila, to coach them and to define the terms of American support for a viable alternative to Marcos. (Escalante & De la Paz, 2000)
The U.S. intervention was also evident during the EDSA uprising. Much as the American government wanted to oust Marcos from power, they wanted the Filipinos to do it, not them. There was constant communication between the reformist soldiers and U.S. government with the latter promising support. Ongoing exchange was also happening between Reagan and Marcos. Moreover, emissaries from both sides were sent to assess how each government was reacting to the situation.
Disclaimers notwithstanding, the ouster of President Marcos which culminated in EDSA was a feat of American political engineering, designed in America but assembled in the Philippines. It was a bully’s masterpiece of destabilizing and finally replacing a weakened government, and then condescendingly letting others take the credit. (Escalante & De La Paz, 2000)
Even after Aquino had assumed the presidency, the Americans continued to work behind the scenes, making sure that the new government toed the line of American interests.
The December 1989 coup could probably have deposed President Aquino. But the Americans, who had done much of the job of installing her to power, came to the rescue. Now there was no need for subterfuge. The restrictions of the Mutual Defense Pact, which limited the use of U.S. troops to situations involving external threats, were expediently ignored. The White House favored Cory Aquino with the type of forceful assistance that was denied Marcos. The Americans, in fact, gloated about their role in snatching victory from the rebels. (Escalante & De la Paz, 2000)
In explaining the EDSA phenomenon, Escalante pointed out that essential requisites were all present for EDSA to succeed: “a united political opposition, a militant citizenry, the Church, and the reformist in the military.” Those factors were what we have seen with our own eyes. What we did not see was the manipulative maneuverings of the Americans behind our back.
Analysis of EDSA phenomenon
EDSA happened at a time when a restive populace was hoping for changes to happen in the country. The excesses of the martial law rule of the Marcoses had done so much havoc instead of good. The four-day EDSA uprising provided a venue for the silent majority to find expression for their pent-up frustrations over a corrupt regime.
Analysts differ in their explanation as to their reasons why they do not regard EDSA as a revolution. Some say it was a spontaneous gathering of people. But the planned coup of the Reformist soldiers and the involvement of the Cardinal in calling people's participation belied this assumption. Some argued it was a pocket mutiny, hence cannot be called a revolution.
Schwenk in his book Onward Christians, the Protestants in the Philippine Revolution, stated that what happened in EDSA was not a revolution in a strict sense.
According to Schwenk, EDSA cannot be called a revolution as defined by conflict theories of social change because it fell short of implementing a radical transformation in Philippine society although acknowledging that the “unjust social order was replaced by a new social order in a nonviolent manner.” (Schwenk, 1986).
The EDSA phenomenon can be considered then as a general social movement as Blumer states in his analysis of social movements.
When martial law was proclaimed, a great majority was thankful because it meant an end for lawlessness that was very rampant at that time. The business sector also rejoiced because they thought martial law would provide a safety environment for business to flourish. Other groups were generally silent because of fear. But they also acknowledged the government’s efforts to implement law and order. However, as excesses of the Marcos regime started to get out of hand, the people started to get restless. “Cultural drifts”, as Blumer calls them, started to develop and empower people to fight for their rights. People started to organize groups and rallies to protest against the excesses of the government.
Blumer explains that general social movements provide the arena from where specific social movements develop. But if EDSA can be considered a general social movement, it did not provide a ground for specific social movements to grow. On the contrary, EDSA became the climax wherein different specific movements have banded together and found expressions of their hopes and aspirations.
It should be noted that prior to martial law, there were so many movements (especially students and labor movements) that were protesting against the government and American imperialism. They quieted down during martial law, but became active again in the 80’s when martial law was lifted. After the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, other movements were organized, one of which was the August Twenty-one Movement to seek justice for Ninoy Aquino. The snap election also created another movement (Corazon Aquino for President Movement) whose main goal was to help Cory Aquino win the presidency. These and other movements as well, (women, students, labor) have found a common cause in EDSA.
Although EDSA does not closely follow Blumer’s description of the development of general social movement, some of its characteristics fit the uniqueness of the four-day EDSA phenomenon.
RAM as a specific social movement
RAM as a specific movement was instrumental in bringing to life one big social movement like EDSA through consolidation of other specific movements, like women’s, youth, labor, military and religious.
RAM followed closely Blumer’s description of a specific social movement. RAM had a specific goal to achieve, which was to unseat Marcos and install a military junta. It had a recognized leader in the person of Col. Gringo Honasan. The members of RAM were deeply united with a sense of brotherhood which is typical among the alumni of the Philippine Military Academy. The movement had a set of values, philosophy, set of rules and body of expectations which was patterned after that of PMA code of ethics. The RAM formed their allegiance and loyalty to the constitution and the people they uphold to protect.
The organization of RAM had also undergone the four stages of development as quoted from Dawson and Getty by Blumer. “These are the stage of social unrest, the stage of popular excitement, the stage of formalization, and the stage of institutionalization.”
The development and organization of a specific social movement become possible because of the presence of vital mechanisms such as (1) agitation, (2) development of esprit de corps, (3) development of morale, (4) the formation of an ideology, and (5) the development of operating tactics (Blumer).
Agitation played an important factor in the organization of RAM. The bigotry and inequality that was at work in the military hierarchy awakened in the young officers a sense of idealism. They began to question the culture of injustice being promoted. They started to demand changes from the prevailing culture. Among the issues the soldiers raised were the tendency of the hierarchy to favor protégés and relatives, lack of professionalism, low pay and insufficient benefits. The soldiers called for reforms that would remedy the problems of favoritism, incompetence and corruption in senior leadership.
The noise that was created by this clamor for reforms got the attention of other soldiers who were aware of what was going on but did not have the guts to question or do anything. These soldiers found in Col. Honasan the kind of leader who was calm and dignified, but perceptive and forthright.
Another technique that gives strength to a social movement is the development of esprit de corps or the common spirit that binds the members of the group.
Esprit de corps is one quality that is very strong among graduates of Philippine Military Academy. So it is not surprising that RAM members will be bound with this common spirit. During EDSA, rebel soldiers used this tactic (reminding loyalist soldiers on their being both PMAers) to win over the loyalists soldiers into their side. The same scenario will again happen in the different coup plots that will be staged against the government later on.
RAM members were held together by a profound sense of brotherhood. This sense of rapport did not only come from being PMAers but also because they were bound by a common goal. This feeling of brotherhood was categorically affirmed during the PMA Alumni homecoming when RAM members courageously came forward with a streamer that obviously worded their loyalty to one another: “We belong.” Esprit de corps did not only develop in the movement to bring it strength. Rather it comes naturally among PMAers. Each one feels obliged to protect the other.
The development of morale is also an important factor since it gives each member of the movement the willpower to go on in the face of adversity. Blumer explained morale as being based on a set of convictions of which he gave three kinds.
First is the conviction of the rectitude of the purpose of the movement. This is accompanied by the belief that the attainment of the objectives of the movement will usher in something approaching a millennial state. What is evil, unjust, improper, and wrong will be eradicated with the success of the movement. In this sense, the goal is always overvalued…
A second conviction closely identified with these beliefs is a faith in the ultimate attainment, by the movement, of its goal. There is believed to be a certain inevitability about this. Since the movement is felt to be a necessary agent for the generation of the world, it is regarded as being in line with the higher moral values of the universe, and in this sense as divinely favored…
Finally, as part of these complex convictions, there is the belief that the movement is charged with a sacred mission… (Blumer)
The first conviction echoed the belief of the RAM members that removing Marcos from power will not only bring back professionalism in the military establishment but also produce a new social order. Before the arrival of people power, Enrile was talking of a military junta, clearly eyeing himself as the president. He will change his position later on when events unfolded in a way they did not expect.
The second conviction is closely related with the first. RAM members believed in the nobility of their purpose. This belief was further enhanced by the unexpected development of events, the overflowing support from the people, the defections of the loyalist soldiers to reformists’ camp, and Marcos stepping down from power.
The third principle was RAM’s belief in the nobility of their purpose. This sense of being charged with a sacred mission to transform the country from political corruption would push them to embark unsuccessfully various coup d'états later on.
Ideology is the soul of the movement and as such plays an essential role in the success of the movement. According to Blumer, “the ideology of the movement consists of a body of doctrine, beliefs and myths” which can be explained in the following:
First, the statement of the objective, purpose, and premises of the movement; second, a body of criticism and condemnation of the existing structure which the movement is attacking and seeking to change; third, a body of defense doctrine which serves as a justification of the movement and of its objectives; fourth, a body of belief dealing with policies, tactics, and practical operation of the movement; and fifth, the myths of the movement. (Blumer)
The initial objective of the movement was to institute reforms and restore professionalism in the military. Later on, however, another purpose was added – the removal of Marcos from power.
RAM issued a manifesto condemning the incompetence of senior leadership in the military and criticizing its lack of professionalism.
The reformists also trained for a year prior their planned coup. They had continuous meeting to brainstorm for ideas and test concepts. They were solidly backed up by Enrile who provided them with logistics and ammunitions
The soldiers believed that their movement would snowball changes in the military that had been politicized by Marcos and Ver.
Finally, it was the soldiers’ profound conviction that their movement will make a difference not only in the military establishment but in the country as a whole. Such belief was verbalized by a “farewell letter” written by Army Captain Ricardo Morales to his parents few days before the coup de etat.
Hello all! By the time this letter gets to you, things will already have happened that shall affect all of us, as a people and as Filipinos… I don’t want to alarm you, but there must be questions in your minds that deserve to be answered…
I have joined a movement that intends to restore pride, self-respect, and democracy to the Filipino and to the motherland. The initial phase of this movement will demand everything a man has to offer – and I have volunteered for it.
I do not do this out of adventurism or recklessness. I really feel that it is my sworn duty – my destiny – to share in a glorious and honorable moment like this. If we fail, then at least we gave our all. If we succeed, then we shall reap the gratitude of a liberated nation… (Mercado, 1986)
Aside from ideology, leadership also gave impetus to the movement. Apart from the leadership of Col. Honasan, the soldiers’ idealism was also boosted by Enrile’s concern and patronage.
The development of operating tactics was the fifth principle that was essential for the success of the movement. The reformists played by the book in observing all the above mechanisms to ensure the success of their goals. First, the core group recruited followers. Then, they developed the morale of the followers by convincing them of the nobility of their purpose. Finally, they worked together for the realization of their purpose through training, planning and testing concepts.
It must be noted from the outset that the reform movement had a very noble purpose in mind when they started to voice out their concern regarding the corruption that was happening in the military. All they wanted in the beginning was to effect changes in the military hierarchy. And in this case, it was indeed true in being a reform movement. However, noting that their grievances were not attended to and their immediate superiors (Enrile and Ramos) were also removed from the chain of command; they started to plot a coup de etat against the government. In this aspect, the RAM has lost the identity of a reform movement and took on the nature of a revolutionary movement.
The Philippine Society then and now
Did EDSA signal a complete transformation in the life of an ordinary Filipino? Eighteen years have passed since EDSA, and if there is anything now some disillusioned Filipinos would have wished to happen, it is that EDSA did not take place.
EDSA was supported by the middle class. Yes, there were poor people there, but they were not the beneficiaries of what EDSA had accomplished. It was the middle class and the oligarchs who divided the spoils. Ironically, even the soldiers who were instrumental in making EDSA happen where also left out in the sidelines. They would soon understand that they would have to resort to the same tactics to effect the changes they desired. But to their chagrin, they realized that people had gone tired of supporting too many mutinies that disrupt their daily routine. And so, they were left alone to fight for their ideals.
If there were any changes that ever happened, they were not radical at all, or else a completely different political system should have been in effect by now. As it is, the country is back in the same sorry state it was during the last years of Marcos regime. Critics would lament the opportunities wasted during the Aquino regime in its failure to implement radical changes to solve a huge financial debt, to address poverty through redistribution of national wealth to poor people, to strengthen the political system by ridding it of graft and corruption and to professionalize the military. These gargantuan problems would haunt not only the Aquino regime but every government that would follow hers.
EDSA fired up the idealism of every ordinary Filipino. There was so much hope there as shown by the prayerful atmosphere, the unity and camaraderie that transpired during those four days. But the fire that lit up the hopes of the Filipinos would extinguish slowly as years roll by. Many would perhaps regret, if not shamed, by the fact that they were taken advantage of to promote the interests of the few.
The Filipinos continue to celebrate the commemoration of people power every year. The Church laments the fact that the vision EDSA had helped shape did not materialize. No radical changes occurred. No transformation of values took place. It is the same system we have as before. It is the same people. Oh yes, there are new ones, but they are of the same color. Critics claim there is nothing to celebrate at EDSA, except for the blessed ones who made it onto the top and have been living happily ever after.
Bibliography
Blumer, Herbert. “Analysis of Social Movements”. Reprinted from New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. Barnes & Noble Publishers.
Elwood, Douglas. (1986). Philippine Revolution 1986. Model of Non-Violent Change. Quezon City. New Day Publishers.
Escalante, Salvador & De la Paz, J. Augustus. (2000). The 1986 EDSA Uprising In
Retrospect. Quezon City. Katotohanan at Katarungan Foundation, Inc.
Hamilton-Paterson, James. (1996). America’s Boy: The Marcoses and the Philippines. Pasig City. Anvil Publishing.
Mercado, Monina (ed). (1986). People Power: An Eyewitness History, the Philippine Revolution of 1986. Manila. Monina Allarey Mercado.
Reader’s Digest. (1998). “The Road to EDSA” in Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People, Vol. 9. Hongkong. Asia Publishing Ltd.
Schwenk, Richard. (1986). Onward, Christians Protestant in the Philippine Revolution. Quezon City. New Day Publishers.
Villacorte, Ricardo. (1989). The Real Hero of EDSA. Quezon City. Berligui
Typographics Corp.
Online Articles:
Philippines – The Armed Forces of the Philippines. Retrieved September 30, 2004 from
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/philippines/philippines47.html
Philippines – The Armed Forces in National Life. Retrieved September 30, 2004 from
www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10511.html - 9k
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